Although the instrument set by monetary policymakers is typically an interest rate, monetary policy affects the economy through other asset prices besides those on debt instruments. Thus, movements in these other asset prices are likely to play an important role in how monetary policy is conducted. But what is the appropriate role for them to play? This paper answers this question by first surveying the monetary transmission mechanism through these other asset prices and then discusses their role in the conduct of monetary policy.
I. Asset Prices in the Monetary Transmission Mechanism
In the literature on the monetary transmission mechanism, there are three categories of asset prices besides those on debt instruments that are viewed as providing important channels through which monetary policy affects the economy: 1) stock market prices, 2) real estate prices, and 3) exchange rates.
Stock Market Prices
Fluctuations of the stock market, which are influenced by monetary policy, have important impacts on the aggregate economy. Transmission mechanisms involving the stock market are of three types: 1) stock market effects on investment, 2) firm balance-sheet effects, 3) household wealth effects and 4) household liquidity effects. Tobin's q-theory (Tobin, 1969) provides an important mechanism for how movements in stock prices can affect the economy. Tobin's q is defined as the market value of firms divided by the replacement cost of capital. If q is high, the market price of firms is high relative to the replacement cost of capital, and new plant and equipment capital is cheap relative to the market value of firms. Companies can then issue stock and get a high price for it relative to the cost of the facilities and equipment they are buying.
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monetary policymakers incorporate movements of these asset prices into their decisions about the conduct of monetary policy?
In looking at the role of asset prices in monetary policy, it is worth separating the discussion into how central banks might respond to exchange rates and how they might respond to fluctuations in stock market and real estate prices.
Exchange Rates
The asset price that typically receives the most attention in discussions of monetary policy is the exchange rate. Central bank's clearly care about the value of the domestic currency for several reasons. Changes in the exchange rate can have a major impact on inflation, particularly in small, open economies. For example, depreciations lead to a rise in inflation as a result of the pass-through from higher import prices and greater demand for net exports, as discussed in the previous section. In addition, the public and politicians pay attention to the exchange rate and this puts pressure on the central bank to alter monetary policy. An appreciation of the domestic currency can make domestic businesses uncompetitive, while a depreciation is often seen as a failure of the central bank, as has recently been the case for the European Central Bank, which has been blamed, I think unfairly, for the euro's decline.
Emerging market countries, quite correctly, have an even greater concern about exchange rate movements. Not only can a real appreciation make domestic industries less competitive, but it can lead to large current account deficits which might make the country more vulnerable to currency crisis if capital inflows turn to outflows. Depreciations in emerging market countries are particularly dangerous because they can be contractionary, as described in the previous section, and can trigger a financial crisis along the lines suggested in Mishkin (1996 Mishkin ( , 1999 .
Concern about exchange rate fluctuations might lead countries to choose to peg their exchange rates to that of another country. In other work, I have discussed the pros and cons of pegging exchange rates as a monetary policy strategy and I will not discuss this issue further. 9 See Mishkin (1999b) and Mishkin and Savastano (2001) .
However, if a country decides that it wants to have its own independent monetary policy, then with open capital markets it has to allow the exchange rate to fluctuate. However, the fact that exchange rate fluctuations are a major concern in so many countries raises the danger that monetary policy may put too much focus on limiting exchange rate movements. This indeed was a problem for Israel in the early stages of its inflation targeting regime. As part of this regime, Israel had an intermediate target of an exchange rate band around a crawling peg, whose rate of crawl was set in a forward-looking manner by deriving it from the inflation target for the coming year. Even though the Bank of Israel downplayed the exchange rate target relative to the inflation target over time, it did slow the Bank's effort to win support for disinflation and lowering of the inflation targets (e.g., see Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen, 1999.) The second problem from a focus on limiting exchange rate fluctuations is that it can induce the wrong policy response when a country if faced with real shocks such as a terms of trade shock. Two graphic examples occurred in New Zealand and Chile in the late 1990s.
Because of the direct impact of exchange rates on inflation, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand tended to focus on the exchange rate as an indicator of the monetary policy stance. By early 1997, the Reserve Bank institutionalized this focus by adopting as its primary indicator of monetary policy a Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) similar to that developed by the Bank of Canada. The idea behind the MCI, which is a weighted average of the exchange rate and a shortterm interest rate, is that both interest rates and exchange rates on average have offsetting impacts on inflation. When the exchange rate falls, this usually leads to higher inflation in the future, and so interest rates need to rise to offset the upward pressure on inflation. However, the offsetting effects of interest rates and exchange rates on inflation depend on the nature of the shocks to the exchange rates. If the exchange rate depreciation comes from portfolio considerations, then it does lead to higher inflation and the optimal response is an interest rate rise. However, if the reason for the exchange rate depreciation is a real shock such as a negative terms of trade shock which decreases the demand for a country's exports, then the situation is entirely different. The negative terms of trade shock reduces aggregate demand and is thus likely to be deflationary.
The correct interest rate response is then a decline in interest rates, not a rise as the MCI suggests.
With the negative terms of trade shock in 1997, the adoption of the MCI in 1997 led to exactly the wrong monetary policy response to East Asian crisis. With depreciation setting in after the crisis began in July 1997 after the devaluation of the Thai baht, the MCI began a sharp decline, indicating that the Reserve Bank needed to raise interest rates, which it did by over 200 basis points. The result was very tight monetary policy, with the overnight cash rate exceeding 9% by June of 1998. Because the depreciation was due to a substantial, negative terms of trade shock which decreased aggregate demand, the tightening of monetary policy, not surprisingly, lead to a severe recession and an undershoot of the inflation target range with actual deflation occurring in 1999. 10 The Reserve Bank of New Zealand did eventually realize its mistake and reversed course, sharply lowering interest rates beginning in July 1998 after the economy had entered a recession, but by then it was too late. It also recognized the problems with using an MCI as an indicator of monetary policy and abandoned it in 1999. Now the Reserve Bank operates monetary policy in a more conventional way, using the overnight cash rate as its policy instrument, with far less emphasis on the exchange rate in its monetary policy decisions.
Chile, which also adopted inflation targeting in the early 1990s, also included a focus on limiting exchange rate fluctuations by having an exchange rate band with a crawling peg which was (loosely) tied to lagged domestic inflation. 11 This focus on the exchange rate induced a serious policy mistake in 1998 because the central bank was afraid it might lose credibility in the face of the financial turmoil if it allowed the exchange rate to depreciate after what had taken place in financial markets after the East Asian crisis and the Russian meltdown, Thus instead of easing monetary policy in the face of the negative terms of trade shock, the central bank raised interest rates sharply and even narrowed its exchange rate band. In hindsight, these decisions appear to have been a mistake: the inflation target was undershot and the economy entered a recession for the first time in the 1990s. With this outcome, the central bank came under strong 10 The terms of trade shock, however, was not the only negative shock the New Zealand economy faced during that period. Its farm sector experienced a severe drought which also hurt the economy. Thus, a mistake in monetary policy was not the only source of the recession. Bad luck played a role too. See Drew and Orr (1999) and Brash (2000) .
11 See Landerretche, Morandé and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) , and Mishkin and Savastano (2001) . 12 Thus in contrast to New Zealand, it immediately lowered the overnight cash rate by 50 basis points to 5% and kept it near at this level until the end of 1998, when it was lowered again by another 25 basis points.
Indeed, the adoption of the inflation targeting regime probably helped the Reserve Bank of Australia to be even more aggressive in its easing in response to the East Asian crisis and helps explain why their response was so rapid. (2000) and Mishkin and Savastano (2001) . For the reasons discussed earlier, emerging market countries with a lot of foreign-denominated debt may not be able to afford sharp depreciations of their currencies which can destroy balance sheets and trigger a sharp fall in aggregate demand. Central banks in these countries may thus have to smooth "excessive" exchange rate fluctuations, while making it clear to the public that they will not preclude the exchange rate from reaching its market-determined level over longer horizons. The stated rationale for exchange rate smoothing is similar to that of interest-rate smoothing, which is practiced by most central banks, even those engaged in inflation targeting: the policy is not aimed at resisting market-determined movements in an asset price, but at mitigating potentially destabilizing effects of abrupt changes in that price.
Stock and Real Estate Prices
With the bursting of the stock market and real estate bubble in Japan at the beginning of the 1990s and the recent stock market boom (and partial reversal) in the United States, there has been a growing debate about how the monetary authorities might best react to stock market and real estate fluctuations. 13 This section will argue that the reaction to these asset prices raises similar issues to the reaction to exchange rate fluctuations. Improved economic performance will result if the policy response depends on the nature of the shocks, while the central bank is not be perceived as having a target for any asset price, whether it is an exchange rate, or stock market or real estate prices.
The discussion of the monetary transmission mechanism in the previous section indicates that real estate and stock price movement do have an important impact on aggregate demand and thus must be followed closely to evaluate the stance of monetary policy. Indeed, with a standard loss function in which the central bank minimizes a weighted average of squared deviations of inflation from its target level and output from potential output, optimal monetary policy will react to changes in real estate and stock market prices. However, depending on the nature of the shock to these prices, and depending on whether the shock is considered to be temporary or permanent, the optimal response of monetary policy would differ. Thus, just as targets for exchange rates would be problematic, so too would targets for real estate and stock prices.
But this still begs the question of whether monetary authorities can improve their performance by trying to prick asset price bubbles, because subsequent collapses of these asset prices might be highly damaging to the economy, as they were in Japan in the 1990s. Cecchetti, Genburg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (1999) , for example, argue that central banks should at times target asset prices in order to stop bubbles from getting too far out of hand. However, there as serious flaws in their argument. First is that it is very hard for monetary authorities to identify that a bubble has actually developed. To assume that they can is to assume that the monetary authorities have better information and predictive ability than the private sector. If the central bank has no informational advantage, then if it knows that a bubble has developed that will eventually crash, then the market knows this too and then the bubble would unravel and thus would be unlikely to develop. Without an informational advantage, the central bank is as likely to mispredict the presence of a bubble as the private market and thus will frequently be mistaken, thus frequently pursuing the wrong monetary policy. Cecchetti, Genburg, Lipski and Wadhwani (1999) find favorable results in their simulations when the central bank conducts policy to prick asset price bubble because they assume that the central bank knows the bubble is in progress.
This assumption is highly dubious because it is hard to believe that the central bank has this kind of informational advantage over private markets. Indeed, the view that government officials know better than the markets has been proved wrong over and over again. Extending their focus to asset prices has the potential to weaken public support for central banks and may even cause the public to worry that the central bank is too powerful, having undue influence over all aspects of the economy.
III. Conclusions
The discussion in this paper shows that other asset prices, and not just interest rates, are important elements of the monetary transmission mechanism. This provides a rationale for why monetary authorities pay a lot of attention to these other asset prices in the conduct of monetary policy. However, this paper has also argued that targeting other asset prices, whether they are exchange rates, real estate or stock market prices, is likely to worsen the performance of monetary policy. This is because the response of monetary policy to asset price fluctuations depends on the nature of the shocks to asset prices and the degree of permanence of the shocks.
Furthermore, targeting asset prices is likely to erode support for the independence of central banks because control of these asset prices is beyond central banks' capabilities. 15 See Mishkin (1999b) and Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999) .
